Problem
Abstract. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demand- ing to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market of specialized provers.
Approach
However, existing market designs either do not fit the ZKP set- ting or lack formal description and analysis. In this work, we propose a formal ZKP market model that captures the interactions between users submitting ZKP tasks and provers compet- ing to generate proofs. Building on this model, we introduce Prooφ, an auction-based ZKP market mechanism.
Results
We prove that Prooφ is incen- tive compatible for users and provers, and budget balanced. We augment Prooφ with system-level designs to address the practical challenges of our setting, such as Sybil attacks, misreporting of prover capacity, and collusion. We analyze our system-level designs and show how they can mitigate the various security concerns. 1